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The Influence and Application of 
Eastern Philosophy in the Western Musical Tradition 
 
Matt Zavortink 
 
The fundamental area that my research grant explores is the connection between the 
disciplines of music and philosophy. Music is an art form that gives rise to intriguing 
philosophical puzzles, many of which have yet to be completely figured out. For instance, why 
do people purposefully seek out and experience sad music? Most people do not purposefully 
seek out sad experiences in their everyday lives, yet see nothing strange about listening to a piece 
of music that will bring them to tears. Other philosophical questions about music are more 
ontological or metaphysical in nature. For example, what constitutes an actual musical work? 
Initially we might think that a piece of music is identical with an individual performance, but this 
is puzzling because subsequent performances may be radically different. The same could be said 
of the sound waves generated by a performance. Some may argue that the piece of music itself is 
the score, but this also seems counter-intuitive because the score itself is incapable of producing 
sound on its own. Other more psychological questions attempt to understand where the emotion 
in music comes from. We talk about particular pieces being ‘triumphant’ or ‘sad,’ which is 
strange given that nothing in the music itself is actually sentient and capable of possessing 
emotions. Do emotions come to us somehow through the music directly from the mind of the 
composer? Or if emotions are entirely overlaid onto the music by listeners, then what makes us 
associate certain emotions with certain chords, instruments, melodies, etc., and can a listener feel 
the ‘wrong’ emotions for a given section or piece of music? 
First, this paper will outline the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, then show how he 
influenced Richard Wagner and some other late romantic composers. I will then discuss my own 
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piece of music, the problems with it and its successes, and how the previously discussed 
philosophy integrates with all of it. My research focuses specifically on the philosopher Arthur 
Schopenhauer, perhaps the first and most influential philosopher to ever devote significant time 
to the discussion of music. Most of the following three paragraphs are a synopsis of the 
information present in chapter nine of The Tristan Chord by Bryan Magee.  
Schopenhauer’s basic philosophy, as articulated in his magnum opus The World as Will 
and  Representation, was based primarily on the preceding work of Immanuel Kant. Kant 
thought that our minds create a mental representation of the world around us, based on input 
from our five senses. These facets of reality which we can directly perceive and therefore 
comprehend Kant categorized into the ‘phenomenal’ world. Anything we have a representation 
of, however, does also exist in the real world as a ‘thing in itself,’ most likely with properties we 
cannot detect, in a completely unknowable ’noumenal’ realm outside of our sense data. It seems 
likely that many objects, even normal everyday ones, like pencils or tables, possess qualities that 
we are incapable of detecting. 
Schopenhauer combined this with another one of Kant’s ideas - that the experience of 
time and space is only possible in the phenomenal world. Schopenhauer reasoned that everything 
in the noumenal must actually be one - because without the experience of time and space it is 
impossible for anything to exist separately or differently from anything else, and these 
experiences are, by definition, only possible in the phenomenal world knowable to our minds. 
Kant believed that the phenomenal and noumenal were causally linked, but Schopenhauer argued 
this wasn’t possible because causality also could not exist outside of time and space. Thus, 
Schopenhauer proposed a different view, that the phenomenal and noumenal are essentially two 
different aspects or faces of the same fundamental reality. For Schopenhauer, the noumenal came 
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to mean the inner most essence, or core of being, that the phenomenal was just an outward 
expression and representation of. 
Schopenhauer viewed the world as a generally cruel place. He regarded people as being 
motivated primarily by selfish reasons. He viewed the natural world as no better, as animals and 
plants in nature are constantly fighting a battle for survival at the cost of other living and often 
sentient organisms. At some point, Schopenhauer discovered that his philosophy contained many 
aspects of certain Eastern religions, like Buddhism and Hinduism, certain branches of which 
teach doctrines of interconnectedness and oneness, respectively. He also found that Buddhism, 
especially, shared his philosophical pessimism about the world. The Buddhist notion of dukkha, 
typically translated simply as ‘suffering,’ claims that existence in the world is inherently 
unsatisfactory. Most religions, such as Christianity, believe that whatever exists at the core of the 
world as we know it (God, eternal souls, Brahman, etc) is fundamentally a positive, good, force. 
Schopenhauer, however, because he had reasoned that the phenomenal and noumenal were two 
different aspects of the same fundamental reality, applied the characteristics he could see in the 
phenomenal world to describe the noumenal as well. Since he saw the world as containing 
endless striving and fundamentally unfulfillable desire, Schopenhauer reasoned that the 
noumenal must also possess these characteristics, and reluctantly coined the term ‘Will’ to 
describe it as a powerful force of blind and unending desire at the core our existence. 
Schopenhauer was greatly admired, even revered, by the late romantic composer Richard 
Wagner. Wagner was unique in that he was perhaps the only highly regarded composer in the 
Western Art Music tradition who was also interested and immersed in philosophy. Although he 
was already an established composer when he was exposed to Schopenhauer’s work, reading The 
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World as Will and Representation led Wagner to challenge and change his worldview and further 
develop his music. 
Schopenhauer viewed music as the one art form that was not representational in nature. A 
painting of a flower is a representation of the visual experience of a flower, which itself is part of 
a phenomenal representation of the noumenal flower in itself. Music, however, was unique to 
Schopenhauer because it was, like the entire phenomenal world, another expression of the Will 
itself, ‘the inner being, the in-itself, of the world’ (Macgee The Tristan Chord 171). For both 
Schopenhauer and Wagner, this fact explained music’s profound expressive power, which they 
believed to be above that of the other arts. 
Wagner took the idea of the endless wanting and striving of the Will and tailored his 
music specifically to exploit this aspect of reality. He used tonality, the system of hierarchical 
pitch organization used in Western Art Music from around 1700 to 1910, to stimulate desire 
within listeners, based off of Schopenhauer’s description of the suspension, a musical device in 
which a ‘suspended’ note sounds as if it should resolve downwards into a chord tone. 
Specifically, Wagner conceived of and composed an entire opera, Tristan und Isolde, around the 
idea of making the listener always dissatisfied and desiring of a harmonic resolution. In doing 
this, he advanced the musical language of his day, and in the minds of many modern music 
theorists, stretched tonality so far that subsequent composers, such as Schoenberg, were more or 
less forced to abandon it in order to write music that sounded harmonically fresh and original. 
This is the backdrop against which my research began. The first issue I would like to 
address is Schopenhauer’s original philosophy verses Wagner’s interpretation. Schopenhauer 
believed that our natural, base state as humans, was one of desire, since our phenomenal 
experience inherits this quality from the noumenal out of which it arises. Although Schopenhauer 
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did not deny that fulfilling desires temporarily satiates them, he believed that by necessity we 
will always return to a state of willing and desire. This led him to praise asceticism as a lifestyle 
and the meditative practices of Eastern religions, which focus on, from the perspective of 
Schopenhauer’s framework, directly experiencing the noumenal in a sustained way that music 
(or sexual intercourse, another brief window into the Will, according to Schopenhauer) cannot 
provide. 
Wagner, although he accepted essentially all of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, added some 
interpretation of his own. Wagner’s music, for example, although it does string the listener along 
for long periods without resolution, does always eventually resolve in the end, effectively 
satisfying the listener’s musical desires. Wagner’s music is obviously indebted to the traditions 
of Western Art Music, which typically call for resolution at the end of a piece, despite the fact 
that this normal resolution is somewhat at odds with Schopenhauer’s philosophy of insatiable 
desire. 
Another, more specific divergence between Wagner and Schopenhauer occurs at the end 
of Tristan und Isolde, when the main characters, unable to be united in love while living, are 
united in death. This moment matches the harmonic resolution of the music, conveying that the 
character’s lustful and worldly desires are in fact satisfied through death, when they literally 
become one with each other in the noumenal. There are several aspects of this which diverge 
from Schopenhauer’s original philosophy. First, Tristan and Isolde are no more together in the 
noumenal after death than they were together in the noumenal before death. Since phenomenal 
reality is an expression of the noumenal, any portion of the characters that may be joined after 
death would also already be noumenally one before death. This is related to the second problem, 
an obvious one, which is that Schopenhauer (and as far as I know Wagner as well) did not 
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believe that individual consciousness persisted after death - so even if Tristan and Isolde did 
become one through death, their experience of oneness would be on the same level that one part 
of a table experiences it is the same with another part of a table, that is, non-existent.  
Lastly, Schopenhauer specifically rejected suicide and death as a means to escape the will 
(Magee Philosophy of Schopenhauer 222). Since everything phenomenal is a manifestation of 
the will, the death of one individual is essentially insignificant and does not strike a significant 
blow towards the will itself. Again, Schopenhauer viewed asceticism, a practice with the 
potential to gradually weaken the will, as far more significant than suicide, which is in some 
sense an affirmation of the will in that it is the expression of an individual’s desire to die. 
These differences between Wagner and Schopenhauer are essentially what prompted me to 
undertake writing a piece of music about the topic, because I am very intrigued by 
Schopenhauer’s original philosophy and the Buddhist views it is similar to. Before talking about 
what I attempted to do in my own music, I would like to briefly discuss two other late romantic 
composer’s approaches to the same problem.  
Gustav Mahler is known to have used the process of composition as a way to personally 
think about and attempt to answer philosophical questions, like the meaning of life. His entire 
3rd symphony is written around themes central to Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Mahler, like 
Wagner, believed that the power of Love could overcome the Will. Both of these elements are 
given their own themes in his 3rd symphony, and as the music unfolds so too does a battle 
between these two opposing forces. The movements of the symphony progress in what they 
represent, beginning with nature, going through man, and ending with angels, although this last 
movement has also been described as the love movement. 
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The fourth movement, which introduces man, is the first place in the music to contain a 
vocal part, and the text nicely depicts the fundamental suffering that Schopenhauer associates 
with existence: “the world is deep... deeps is its woe.” The text is taken from a poem by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, whose original philosophical musings were prompted by conversations with Wagner 
and thus also influenced by Schopenhauer. The word ‘depth’ in the text fits nicely with 
Schopenhauer’s idea of the phenomenal and noumenal being two different layers of reality. 
The last movement contains the piece’s climax depicting a battle between the Love and 
Will themes. The love theme ultimately wins, triumphantly, and the piece ends (all of the above 
programatic information comes from Hansen). My problem with Mahler’s approach is that he 
represents the philosophical aspects of the work motivically rather than integrating them into his 
musical language like Wagner. The strange thing is that Schopenhauer already did the work of 
linking the Will to musical language by stating that music is a manifestation of the Will, and by 
pointing out the desire, or willing, that occurs when certain musical devices are employed. If we 
were writing a piece of music to represent, for a random example, the union of two people in 
marriage, a motivic approach might make sense; we could create a motive, or melody, for each 
person, and as the characters grow closer, we could bring their themes closer together through 
various musical means: adjusting their styles to be more consistent, using increasingly related 
key areas, combining them in counterpoint, etc. Representing the Will with a motive, however, is 
strange because the Will is already inherent in our experience of music, unlike the idea of 
characters or of marriage. Music is literally, for Schopenhauer, another embodiment of the Will 
just like the phenomenal world, which is why it stimulates desire in listeners so effectively 
compared to other artistic media. We hear certain chords and a desire is created within us for 
them to resolve to specific other chords, which is essentially a direct experience of the Will. Thus 
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Mahler’s approach of representing the Will with a motive seems to overlook an obvious fact, that 
it doesn’t need to be represented. This would be analogous to writing a piece of music and 
having a motive representing sound, which should seem obviously absurd because sound is 
fundamentally a part of music. 
Another problem with Mahler’s approach is that the Love motive also uses tonal 
harmony, which, like the suspension that Schopenhauer used as an example, is particularly 
excellent at stimulating the Will in the listener. So although the Will motive is destroyed in the 
music, the Will itself is more alive than ever at the end of the piece, as we repeatedly have our 
desire stimulated by dominant chords which resolve to the tonic. Thus Mahler has actually 
accidentally represented Schopenhauer’s philosophy in a way that he didn’t intend to, opposing 
his own conscious interpretation that Love can counter the Will, by showing a Will that is 
fundamentally inescapable. 
Richard Strauss, although he lived significantly later than Wagner, often shared the other 
composer’s late romantic aesthetic and language. Strauss was also influenced by philosophy, 
especially Nietzsche, but also Schopenhauer’s and Wagner’s. His opera Elektra, although not 
particularly well known for representing these themes, is, in my view, very similar to Tristan und 
Isolde in the way that it presents the act of living as being synonymous with being in a state of 
desire. In Tristan und Isolde, like I already described, the main characters have a desire to be 
together that Wagner portrays as only being achievable through death. In Elektra, the eponymous 
main character is obsessed with obtaining revenge on her mother, Clytemnestra, for the murder 
of her father, to the point that this one singular desire dominates her life. At the end of the opera 
Elektra’s brother, Orestes, returns to the household and kills Clytemnestra and her new husband. 
This satisfies Elektra’s desire and she dies. The explanation for this initially shocking and 
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nonsensical turn of events is that Elektra essentially has no reason to live now that she has 
obtained fulfillment of her one desire. Strauss and Hofmannsthal (the librettist) clearly depict 
living and desiring as being intimately linked, and therefore once all desire is fulfilled, life 
logically must end as well.  
Musically, Elektra is interesting because Strauss incorporates moments of relatively 
extreme (for the time) dissonance and atonality. These were included as a sort of experiment in a 
more Modernist harmonic language (which Strauss subsequently abandoned in his later operas) 
and to represent the graphic nature of the libretto (Robinson chapter 8). The end of the opera is 
very tonal and triumphant, even though a murder is taking place, which is interesting because the 
presence of chords needing to resolve, and then resolving, lets listeners directly experience the 
same kind of release that Elektra is feeling as her desire is fulfilled. The non-tonal sections of 
Elektra are often dissonant and somewhat jarring, so in this sense Strauss clearly avoids setting 
up the same kinds of musical expectations and resolutions that are present at the end of the opera, 
thereby avoiding as direct a stimulation of the Will in listeners. 
Ultimately, Elektra dies and the opera ends. The music obviously must stop here too, but 
it is almost as if, having resolved itself, it also has nothing left to do and must therefore end as 
well. Although Elektra deals with similar elements as Tristan und Isolde in this way, it is 
different in that Strauss does not attempt to present some kind of solution to the problem of the 
Will. The presence of the Will can be used to help explain the ending of the opera, but Elektra’s 
fate is not one that concertgoers typically empathize with and aspire to attain. Thus the Will is an 
important part of the plot, but not something that Strauss or Hofmannsthal attack and attempt to 
overcome in the manner of Wagner or Mahler. 
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For my project I wanted to deeply integrate philosophy and musical language in the style 
of Wagner. I was also interested in more closely representing the original philosophy of 
Schopenhauer, meaning I would not add my own interpretations on top, such as death or love 
defeating the Will in some epic metaphysical battle. For this reason I studied Buddhist sources 
dealing with the negation of desire, because this (specifically asceticism and meditation) is a 
method that Schopenhauer endorsed for gaining an understanding of noumenal reality and in 
essence, resisting the Will. Since Wagner did such a good job using functional harmony, an 
integral part of tonality, to stimulate the Will in his listeners, I wanted to include some tonal 
elements but contrast them with atonality, like in Elektra as I mentioned above, as a way to 
represent the negation of desire. I will now discuss the various problems with my own approach 
that I encountered over the course of writing, its successes, and how all of this influences the 
final version of my piece. 
The first problem is that musical desire is extremely difficult to negate. Although tonal 
harmony is excellent at creating the desire for a specific resolution, completely removing desire 
from music is very difficult, perhaps impossible, and probably more dependent on the individual 
listener than the music itself. Both specifically and stereotypically the word ‘atonality’ is 
associated with a style of music known as ‘Expressionism,’ which is typically very dissonant. 
One could imagine, if I wrote a piece that moved from tonality, which is relatively consonant, to 
expressionistic atonality, that the listeners would probably gain the desire for the ‘pretty’ tonal 
part to come back. Upon listening to straight atonal expressionism, many average listeners are 
instilled with the desire for the piece to end. Furthermore, expectations and desires can be 
created harmonically or melodically in atonal music, or in tonal music but with elements that are 
not related to pitch, such as rhythm or texture. 
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Another problem, one evident in my final piece, is that the musical language required to 
show the negation of desire is extremely derivative. By this I mean that it is dependent on many 
external things, such as other pieces of music. The same could actually be said of Wagner’s 
Tristan und Isolde. Music theory distinguishes between several types of cadences (typically the 
end of a phrase), the two of importance here being the authentic and the deceptive. The authentic 
cadence sounds as if tension is being properly resolved; the deceptive cadence, however, sounds 
somewhat shocking, as we are typically given two of the notes we expect but also a third, 
musically unexpected note. This is one device that Wagner uses to continually frustrate and spin 
out our musical desire in Tristan und Isolde (personal analysis of the score). The problem with 
this approach is that it relies on listeners expecting authentic cadences and hearing deceptive 
cadences.  Although this could be the subject of another research grant entirely, I will voice my 
opinion here that mathematically (perhaps ‘inherently’ is a better word) there is no reason we 
should expect to hear one type of cadence instead of the other. Rather, we have been 
conditioned, by listening to large amounts of tonal music, where authentic cadences are 
prevalent, to expect them. Thus if someone was born and raised never having listened to tonal 
music, and was first exposed to Tristan und Isolde, their mind would probably deduce, quite 
correctly in this case, that deceptive cadences are the norm, and that authentic cadences sound 
strange in comparison. Thus the work derives much of its emotional impact from the listener’s 
familiarity with other music. 
Although most listeners probably don’t perceive this as a problem, as a composer with 
the desire to produce pieces that are both unified and original, this aspect of my proposal has 
plagued my compositional process from the beginning. The majority of my final piece lacks 
tonality, except for a few measures in the middle. This does certainly draw out some sense of 
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desire for resolution in my ear, although this isn’t really indicative of anything extraordinary in 
my musical language, rather just the fact that I am familiar with tonality from hearing it in other 
settings. Furthermore, the sense of desire created in my piece is probably less than in a 
completely tonal piece, since the tonal musical language, when it happens, is relatively 
unexpected, and the listener’s mind might not be able to deduce immediately whether to ‘buy 
into it’ and expect a ‘normal’ tonal resolution. My piece is fairly well unified motivically, but I 
struggled to produce a unified harmonic language that produces the effect I wanted. Perhaps I 
can find solace in the fact that, as I reasoned above, Wagner’s language was also harmonically 
derivative and dependent on outside influences for its sense of unification. 
Although Schopenhauer and Wagner both dealt primarily with desire, I also wanted to 
represent the Buddhist conception of the self. The notion of self is important and related because 
when we have desires, we normally think of them as coming ‘from’ the self, or as being a part of 
or applying to the self. The traditional Buddhist perspective, however, is that there is no separate, 
fixed, volitional entity outside of our moment to moment experience that can or should be 
labeled as the self. The Buddha taught this as one of the Three Characteristics that apply to all 
phenomenal things, the other two being the notion of impermanence and inherent suffering or 
unease, which is essentially the equivalent of Schopenhauer’s idea of the Will. Since it is 
difficult to understand, I will give a brief description of the anatta (no self) doctrine in the next 
paragraph before returning to my discussion of the music. The arguments below are nicely 
outlined in the book Buddhism, Knowledge and Liberation by David Burton. 
The arguments given for anatta are varied and multitudinous, so I will not even attempt to 
overview all of them here. It should also be understood that ultimately, anatta is something that 
Buddhists aspire to actually experience and live, rather than understand on an intellectual level. 
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Since it helps understand the whole of Buddhist philosophy and my research grant, I will 
overview some arguments here anyways. When we typically think of our ‘self’ we ascribe it 
various properties, such as being volitional and controlling our actions. Buddhist thought further 
divides our phenomenal reality into five interrelated skandhas (aggregates): form (for example 
the body), sensation or feeling (such as pain or happiness), perception or discrimination 
(essentially the recognition of distinct objects), mental formations (like thoughts and opinions), 
and lastly consciousness or awareness. It is clear that when our reality is divided up in this way, 
we cannot attribute properties like volition to any one of these elements. Fundamentally we may 
believe that the ‘I’ or our ‘self’ is equivalent to form, i.e. our body, but most of us would still feel 
like the same person if we were, for example, missing a hand. On another level, we know that the 
cells in our bodies are constantly being replaced, so that from day to day, our body changes 
drastically. It has been hypothesized that over the course of 10 years every single cell in our body 
dies and is replaced with a new one. If this is true, then it is very curious that our sense of self 
remains relatively constant over this time period, and further points to the fact that the self 
cannot be equated with the first aggregate of material form. On another hand it seems like 
perhaps our thoughts control our body, and are therefore the volitional controlling ‘self’. In this 
case, Buddhists would say there are times when we feel as if our thoughts are controlling 
something, like the act of walking, yet other times when we are thinking about something else 
entirely and the aforementioned act is still happening. This implies that on a certain level the 
processes that occur in the body occur without the intervention of conscious thought. Also, there 
are times when thought disappears, perhaps when we are absorbed in an activity like running or 
listening to music, implying that the self, if it is to be equated with the aggregate of mental 
processes, is extremely fleeting and transient, a property that certainly does not fit all with our 
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intuitive sense of self. Regarding sensation and feeling, advocates of anatta frequently 
acknowledge that there is indeed a ‘sense’ of self, but then question what this sense points 
towards, or if there is any part of it that is inherently more self like than other things we sense, 
like anger, happiness or hungriness. Although this may not have been a convincing overview, 
hopefully it gives enough of an overview of the anatta doctrine to at least show that it has some 
logical ground and deserves serious consideration. 
Whereas desire in listeners can actually be stimulated by music, it seems identity can 
only be represented. This is a common thing for composers to do, for example Richard Strauss’s 
tone poem Also Sprach Zarathustra, based on the eponymous text by Nietzsche, which uses 
many musical leitmotifs that are representational of their subject matter on a purely abstract 
level. I represent the conception of the self with the presence of a collection of pitches. The 
beginning and end of the piece are chromatically saturated, that is, they contain all twelve pitches 
in approximately equal proportion (although not exactly proportional in the manner of serialism), 
so there should be no specific pitch collection that jumps out. In the middle of the piece, 
however, I create a specific, typically diatonic (major or minor), collection of pitches, which 
slowly shifts around, representing the constantly changing nature of our identities according to 
Buddhist thought, and eventually gives rise to the entirely tonal section, representing and 
hopefully stimulating desire. In this way I have connected a sense of identity and desire in a way 
similar to Buddhist psychology and philosophy, where part of transcending desires is in the 
ability to unidentify with them and allow them to simply exist without the need to be fulfilled. 
Nearing the end of the piece, the fixed key and tonality disappear, dissolving both identity and 
desire, returning to the slow moving chromatically saturated harmony that began the piece and 
does not stimulate the desire for any particular resolution. 
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I also, in order to represent the dissolution of identity, have the main motive of the piece 
dissolve into fragments. This is somewhat backwards of the ‘normal’ course of western music, 
particularly the sonata form, where a theme is exposed, then developed, where it often undergoes 
drastic change, and then finally recapped in a manner somewhat similar to the exposition. In my 
piece, the main theme is exposed, first in an atonal setting, then repeated tonally, and finally 
disintegrated as the piece ends. Again, this represents the idea of the self, and the inherent desire 
that comes with a sense of self, as something that can be overcome through meditation and 
understanding of anatta, or, as Schopenhauer would have said, the negation of the Will. 
Overall I believe I did an acceptable job of integrating the philosophy I read with the music I 
wrote. I learned a great deal about the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Buddhism, and I felt my 
abilities as a composer grow as well. I am anxious to attempt a project like this again once my 
technical skills as a composer are at a higher level. In the future I would like to attempt to write a 
series of shorter pieces, or several movements of one piece, which explore a variety of different 
ways of confronting the idea of the Will and negating desire in a musical setting. 
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